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On Sunday morning, 9 January 1905, 150,000 workers and their families marched from 
various parts of St. Petersburg and converged upon the Winter Palace to present a “Most 
Loyal and Humble Address” to tsar Nicholas II asking him to improve the conditions of 
the workers.  The marchers sang hymns and carried icons and crosses, and were led by a 
Russian Orthodox priest, Father Georgii Gapon, resembling a religious procession more 
than a labor demonstration.  The workers, led by Gapon, believed in the benevolence of 
the Tsar, the batiushka (“little father”), and that he would listen to their troubles and help 
them.  The day before, however, the government had ordered the march be cancelled and 
posted 12,000 troops in the city to prevent the marchers from reaching the palace, while 
Nicholas II had left Petersburg to spend the weekend at the suburban palace in Tsarskoe 
Selo.   As the first group of marchers converged upon the Narva Gates, troops opened 
fire upon the unarmed crowd, killing forty and wounding hundreds.  In other parts of the 
city soldiers also attacked the marchers, culminating in the attack on a large crowd that 
approached the  Winter  Palace  in  the  afternoon.   In  all,  some 150 people,  including 
women  and  children,  were  killed.   That  infamous  day,  known  as  Bloody  Sunday, 
destroyed the popular  myth of  the benevolent  tsar  and initiated two years of  chaos, 
strikes, and violence known as the Revolution of 1905, which nearly brought the regime 
to its knees and forced it grudgingly to make significant concessions, above all the move 
toward  establishing  a  constitutional  monarchy  with  the  October  Manifesto  and  the 
Duma.1  
The  march  on  Bloody  Sunday  was  organized  by  the  Assembly  of  Russian 
Workers, Russia’s first mass labor organization, which itself had been founded and led 
by  Fr.  Gapon.   As  a  result,  Fr.  Gapon  is  probably  the  most  well-known  Russian 
Orthodox  clergyman  to  western  historians.   There  has,  naturally,  been  significant 
attention paid to the Assembly of Russian Workers, and Fr. Gapon’s leadership has been 
the  focus  of  historical  controversy.   Soviet  scholars,  followed  by  some  western 
historians,  focused  on  his  ties  to  the  police  and  portrayed  him as  a  provocateur,  a 
government agent whose activities were ultimately directed against the labor movement 
and the cause of revolution.   Walter Sablinsky, who wrote the most extensive study of 
Gapon and the Assembly, demonstrated that the priest genuinely sympathized with the 
workers’ cause and sought to ameliorate their conditions.  Despite the fact that Gapon 
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was a priest,  however, virtually no attention has been paid to his relationship to the 
Russian Orthodox Church.  Until recently, scholars ignored the Church’s own role in 
shaping Gapon’s values and aspirations.  This neglect of Gapon’s relationship to the 
Church stems from assumptions that historians have long held—and many continue to 
hold—about the Church, namely that it was a “faithful tool in the hands of the Tsar” and 
the “central ideological pillar of the tsarist regime.”2 
The standard depiction of the Orthodox Church in the historiography of Imperial 
Russia portrayed a moribund institution, totally subordinated to the state and serving to 
uphold the tsarist political and social order.  According to this interpretation, Orthodoxy 
preached to the masses a doctrine of resignation and acceptance of one’s lot; its focus 
was completely otherworldly and concerned especially with ritual.  Peter the Great’s 
reforms reputedly eliminated any independence the Church retained and incorporated it 
into the state bureaucracy. The Church is portrayed as either wholly indifferent to social 
concerns, or worse still, as an instrument of repression and exploitation.3
Historians of Russia of virtually all persuasions have adhered to this view of the 
Church,  and it  was one of the few points  upon which Soviet and western historians 
agreed.   The  Church,  lacking  any  institutional  or  ideological  distinctiveness,  was 
deemed unworthy of study in its own right.  Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
younger  scholars  are  asking  new  questions,  and  this  research  demands  a  dramatic 
reassessment of our understanding of the Church itself and its relationship to state and 
society. Many of the old stereotypes about the Church, however, continue to be repeated 
in  surveys  of  Russian history.  To begin with,  misrepresentations  of  Orthodoxy stem 
from a lack of understanding of the nature of the “Church” itself; pronouncements of the 
Holy Synod are often taken as synonymous with “the Church” as a whole. It was not, 
however, a monolith, but a complex institution and social body that contained a breadth 
of positions and attitudes.4 This article, which synthesizes much of the recent research, 
focuses on the Church in St. Petersburg during the period of rapid urban growth and 
industrialization,  surveying  the  relationship  between  the  clergy  and  the  urban 
population, particularly workers. It argues that the capital’s clergy developed a powerful 
and effective social mission, which found expression in the efforts of Fr. Gapon and 
other clergy of the city, demonstrating that the Church did not simply seek to uphold the 
old order, but rather sought to re-make Russian society along Christian lines.
The concept of “Social Gospel” generally refers, of course, to developments in 
the United States. The Social Gospel movement, or Social Christianity, developed in 
America between the 1880s and World War I  in response to rapid urbanization and 
industrialization, where unrestricted capitalism resulted in increased poverty and misery 
of the laboring classes who, for their part, grew increasingly alienated from middle class 
and mainstream Protestantism. Social Christianity emerged in part as an extension of 
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developments in liberal theology, according to which theologians such as the German 
Albrecht Ritschl emphasized that the goal of Christianity was the moral integration of 
humanity into the Kingdom of God. By extension, American Social Gospel theologians 
such as Walter Rauschenbusch taught that the message of Jesus was directed not only 
toward the salvation of individuals but also toward the entire social dimension of human 
existence, toward the realization of the Kingdom of God on earth. There were different 
tendencies within Social Christianity in America: conservatives such as Josiah Strong 
argued that the churches needed to minister to the urban poor, though the ultimate goal 
was  still  the  salvation  of  the  individual.  Progressives  such  as  Rauschenbusch  and 
Washington  Gladden believed  that  the  Kingdom of  God could  be  realized  on  earth 
progressively through a spirit of cooperation that would replace the competition fostered 
by capitalism. As such, they sympathized with the labor movement and its efforts to 
improve conditions  for  workers,  as  well  as  advocating  reform of  social  institutions. 
Radicals, such as W. D. P. Bliss, held that the Kingdom was to be realized through 
immediate change of the social and political structure, and as such sympathized with 
socialism. Not limited to Protestantism, after Pope Leo XIII issued Rerum Novarum in 
1891 Catholics in America also called for social and economic reform. 
The primary institutional expressions of the Social Gospel were city missions, 
which provided meals, lodging, and other services such as vocational instruction and day 
care for children; and the “institutional church,” which responded to social  needs of 
urban workers by offering educational and recreational programs (the YMCA/YWCA 
movement and the Salvation Army also emerged in this context). Adherents of Social 
Christianity  of  all  stripes  were  also  actively  involved  in  the  temperance  movement, 
which  was  aimed  at  improving  the  situation  of  urban  poor  that  was  aggravated  by 
increasing  consumption  of  alcohol.  While  the  optimism  of  Social  Gospel  theology 
would be severely challenged by a new generation of theologians after World War I, 
concern  with  the  social  implications  of  Christianity  left  a  fundamental  imprint  on 
mainstream Protestantism and Roman Catholicism in the twentieth century.5 While the 
Russian  social,  religious,  and  political  situation  was  dramatically  different  from the 
American,  many  of  the  concerns,  efforts,  and  tensions  of  the  Russian  clergy  are 
comparable to their American counterparts.
Church, State, and the Social Order
Gregory Freeze was one of the first to challenge many of the stereotypes about 
the Russian Church.  In a seminal essay,  “Handmaiden of the State? The Church in 
Imperial Russia Reconsidered,” Freeze argues that the Petrine reforms were intended to 
modernize the Church and make it more efficient at its spiritual tasks by developing its 
institutional  infrastructure  in  order  to  minister  to  believers—and  did  not  make  it  a 
department of the state.  Peter sought not to secularize the Church, but to “spiritualize” 
it, to reduce its involvement in secular affairs and concentrate its efforts on spiritual 
ones.  The Church exercised exclusive authority in important spheres (such as marriage 
5
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and divorce), retained its institutional distinctiveness, and continued to pursue its own 
aims.6
Freeze has also demonstrated that the Church did not act as either an ideological 
or  institutional  support  for  serfdom  and  repression  in  the  pre-Reform  period.7 The 
Enlightened hierarchy of the eighteenth century embraced Peter’s effort to separate the 
secular and spiritual spheres.8  The Church adopted a view of its mission as serving the 
spiritual needs of its flock, above all through liturgy and the sacraments.  Therefore the 
Church, on the whole, stayed out of active participation in social and political issues 
during the pre-Reform era.   At  the same time, the Church did not justify or defend 
serfdom,  and in  its  sermons emphasized mutual  reciprocity  of  duties  of  squires  and 
peasants rather than simply obedience of the latter to the former.  By the second quarter 
of the nineteenth century, moreover, the Church grew increasingly critical of serfdom 
because  it  regarded  the  landlords  as  barriers  rather  than  assistants  in  their  spiritual 
mission to the peasantry.9
At  the  same  time,  the  reforms  of  Peter  and  especially  Catherine  the  Great 
undermined the Church’s involvement in charity. Traditional Russian beliefs, according 
to Adele Lindenmeyr, regarded the poor as “‘unfortunates’ deserving pity and aid, rather 
than  as  ne’er-do-wells,  parasites,  or  threats  to  the  public  order.”10 The  poor  and 
unfortunate were identified with Christ both in the Church’s teachings and in popular 
beliefs.  The  Church  particularly  emphasized  and  idealized  direct,  person-to-person 
giving.  Charity  was  not  intended  to  eliminate  economic  disparity,  but  to  transcend 
disparity by uniting rich and poor in Christian brotherhood. All goods were ultimately 
from God, and as Tikhon of Zadonsk wrote, “it is the duty of the rich man to give, and 
the beggar to accept gratefully, and to shower the giver with zealous prayers.”11  Since 
individual giving was emphasized, institutional forms of charity were less developed. 
Nevertheless,  in  medieval  Russia  monasteries,  parishes,  and  brotherhoods  often 
supported almshouses and other charitable services, and the Church was the primary 
source of institutional charity. Catherine the Great’s secularization of ecclesiastical lands 
in 1764, however, “decisively eliminated the Church as the financial and institutional 
foundation  of  organized  assistance.”  While  Catherine  organized  charity  under  state 
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administration, this remained undeveloped before the 1860s, with serfdom serving as the 
primary social network.12
During the Reform era a  new theology began to  develop in  the Church that 
challenged the old assumptions of the Church’s role as restricted to its liturgical and 
sacramental  functions,  and  embraced  instead  a  vision of  Church  involvement  in  the 
world.  In the late 1850s, this new theological perspective was developed by professors 
in  the  youngest  of  the  four  Theological  Academies  (the  pinnacle  of  the  Church’s 
educational system) in Kazan.  The most articulate and influential spokesman for the 
new theology was Archimandrite Fedor (Bukharev), dean of students and professor of 
theology at the Academy. Just as Christ, the Son of God, became human, so also the 
Church according to Fedor must enter into and Christianize the world.  Though he was 
not politically or socially liberal, Fedor asserted that the Church must play an active role 
in the world. These teachings influenced others at the Kazan Academy, which led to the 
controversial  requiem for the peasants killed during the uprising at  Bezdna in  April 
1861.  From that time increasing numbers of clergy came to regard the Church’s role as 
not  exclusively  spiritual,  but  also as  one  that  would have  a  positive  impact  on  this 
world.13
St. Petersburg and the Social Gospel
While  the  official  investigation  of  the  Bezdna  requiem  put  an  end  to  the 
development  of  Social  Gospel  tendencies  at  the  Kazan  Theological  Academy, 
Archimandrite Fedor had already transferred to the St. Petersburg Theological Academy 
and begun to have a dramatic impact on the development of the Church’s mission to the 
world there.   Local clergy in St. Petersburg began to experiment with a more active 
ministry, addressing both the spiritual and the material needs of their parishioners.14  By 
the 1880s, professors at the Petersburg Theological Academy developed a new theology 
of priestly service.  They focused on the priest’s responsibilities toward his flock, and 
preferred the term pastor to refer to his primary function, de-emphasizing the term priest  
(sviashchennik) with its connotations of liturgical service.  The task of the pastor was to 
provide a broad moral leadership to the faithful, above all by presenting an example of 
service to others.  Such a model of service entailed charity, helping those who suffered 
material  want, and spiritual counsel.   Thus the ideals  of Archimandrite Fedor of the 
Church’s mission to transform the world through Christian teaching were given concrete 
elaboration in a pastoral theology and training designed to form a new generation of 
clergy who would directly touch the lives of the faithful.15
12
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The development of new ideals of the pastorate had a significant impact on the 
clergy  trained  in  St.  Petersburg.   In  the  post-Reform  era,  these  new  ideals  found 
expression in the development of Church charity. After Catherine the Great’s reforms, 
charity was left to local authorities, which did little, nor did the restrictive atmosphere of 
Nicholas I (1825-1855) help to promote the development of charity. The changes of the 
Great Reforms placed a new emphasis on local initiative, and this applied to the Church 
as well as to secular institutions such as the  zemstvo (system of local self-government 
that was elected from all classes, introduced during the Great Reforms).  In particular, 
the parish reform project of the 1860s allowed local initiative to develop at the grass-
roots level.16  As a result, the majority of parishes of St. Petersburg organized charities in 
the 1860s and 1870s.  The development of these parish charities typically involved the 
leadership of both parish clergy and laity  working together,  relying on the financial 
support  of  a  wide  array of  people,  including members  of  the  royal  family,  nobility, 
merchants, and manufacturers. Directed primarily to the needy, some provided material 
aid (food, clothing and money), while others supported almshouses or schools.17
The  development  of  charity  was  influenced  by  the  Church’s  teachings  with 
regard to Christ’s commandment to love one’s neighbor and to feed the hungry, clothe 
the naked, and visit the sick. For the Petersburg clergy, the charitable work of the second 
half of the nineteenth century was one of the most concrete means of realizing the new 
vision of the Church and its ministry in the world.  They saw themselves as leading by 
example in the act of Christian love and in the creation of community.  Their vision 
clearly found response among active laity within their parishes, and served significant 
numbers  of  needy in  the capital,  which were  rapidly  expanding  with  the  growth of 
industrialization and the massive influx of peasant-workers.18 Many clergy during the era 
of the Great Reforms, particularly in St. Petersburg, understood their pastoral service to 
entail the building of the Kingdom of God as a moral endeavor. By teaching the Gospel 
and practicing it in their own lives through charity, they believed they contributed to the 
realization of the Kingdom of God on earth.  Church authorities allowed the Petersburg 
Academy to take a more active public role so that it would have a greater influence on 
society.19  The Academy, and the clergy of Petersburg, were allowed to continue their 
work even in the era of counter-reforms under Alexander III in the 1880s and 1890s, in 
part because conservatives such as K. P. Pobedonostsev, the chief procurator of the Holy 
Synod, believed that the Church’s involvement would have a conservative, beneficial 
effect on society.20
John of Kronstadt (1829-1908)
 The most famous priest of post-Reform Russia was undoubtedly Ioann Sergiev, 
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or John of Kronstadt.  Fr. John was a product of the Petersburg Theological Academy on 
the eve of the Great Reforms, from which he graduated in 1855 and was ordained a 
priest,  taking up his post at the cathedral church on the island of Kronstadt near St. 
Petersburg.  Though he was a student in the period before Archimandrite Fedor and the 
new directions in theology, he developed his own pastorate in a way that expressed 
many of the same ideals of the Petersburg Academy.  He had a very exalted conception 
of the priestly calling, and placed great significance on his service of the liturgy and the 
sacraments.  He wanted to communicate the profundity of the Eucharist and the liturgy 
to his parishioners, and he developed a very personal style of serving, expressing his 
emotions (sometimes weeping or crying) in the service.  In contrast to the norms of the 
day,  he advocated frequent confession and communion. Fr. John was an exceptional 
confessor, and for this reason people flocked to him for confession.  As his renown 
spread, he used to hear confessions for several hours a day, and during Great Lent he 
would receive thousands at a time in collective confessions.21  He also sought to make 
the Church’s teachings and services more intelligible and comprehensible to his flock 
through instruction and preaching,  calling for  a  personal,  intellectual,  and emotional 
internalization of the faith.22
Father John took the Gospel injunction to serve the poor literally, and frequently 
gave all he had to the poor even in the face of his inclinations to the contrary (he himself 
grew up in, and therefore feared, poverty).  He believed that Russia was an Orthodox 
Christian society and therefore it should live up to the Gospel.  He did not, however, 
idealize Russia, but criticized contemporary society and political authorities in an effort 
to bring them closer to the ideal.  Because he compelled himself to give, he thought that 
others should also be obliged to give.  He was particularly critical of the wealthy, who 
bore a greater responsibility for society and yet were not rooted in Orthodoxy and did 
not share their immense wealth with those less fortunate.  He railed against them for 
indulging in luxuries while the poor around them suffered. In his popular book, My Life  
in Christ, he wrote:
What is false gratitude to God? Gratitude is false when, having received 
bountiful, undeserved spiritual and material gifts from God, people thank God 
for  them with their  tongue,  and use  them only  for  their  own advantage,  not 
sharing them with their neighbors; when they obtain them and conceal them in 
their banks or galleries or libraries, or what have you, and thus deprive many of 
their brethren… of food, drink, clothing, of dwelling; or of healing; or of the 
means of moving in order to get a living. Such gratitude is false and ungodly…. 
But how many such ‘grateful’ men there are!… It is not just for the rich to keep 
excess  wealth  when  there  are  many  poor  people  in  need  of  the  means  of 
existence, of necessary clothing and dwellings.23
Indeed, he linked salvation to giving: Fr. John viewed all of the people as one body, and 
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the rich were saved by giving, and the poor by praying. Thus he shared the traditional 
view of poverty and charity, but gave it a forceful articulation. 
Because he thought in social, rather than individual terms, he came to view the 
solution as a civic one. He himself organized welfare and work assistance programs, 
which came to fruition in 1881 with the foundation of the House of Industry (Dom 
Trodoliubiia).  In the late nineteenth century, Russia faced not only poverty, but also a 
new problem: unemployment. Therefore Fr. John’s House of Industry gave food, shelter, 
and money to the needy in exchange for work, and also trained them in skills so they 
could find better employment.24  The House of Industry also had a library,  provided 
lectures and evening courses for adults as well as a school for children; it  became a 
model for other such institutions.  Fr. John supported a host of other institutions such as 
temperance societies,  orphanages,  and organizations for wounded veterans.25  At  the 
same time, Fr. John was no political liberal.  While he remained apolitical until 1881, 
after  the  assassination  of  Alexander  II  he  vigorously  opposed  the  revolutionary 
movement.  Despite his own censure of the rich and of social inequalities, he believed 
that  the  revolutionaries  threatened  the  integrity  of  the  kind  of  Christian  society  he 
envisioned.   In  the  last  years  of  his  life,  particularly  after  the  1905 Revolution,  he 
became  allied  with  right-wing  forces  and  vociferous  in  his  condemnation  of  the 
revolutionary movement.26
The Society for Moral-Religious Enlightenment
The most visible and effective expression of the Church’s new vision was its 
largest  voluntary  association,  the  Society  for  the  Spread  of  Moral-Religious 
Enlightenment in the Spirit of the Orthodox Church (SMRE), also founded in 1881.  The 
Society was established on the initiative of both clergy and laity, and by the end of the 
century  it  developed into  a  full-fledged  organization  with  its  own clergy,  churches, 
funds, and a wide array of activities and services. It was initially founded in response to 
the  success  that  the  English Protestant  missionary  Lord  Radstock,  together  with his 
Russian disciple Colonel Pashkov, were having in Petersburg—particularly among the 
aristocracy.27  The  Society  sought  to  educate  the  Russian  faithful  in  a  conscious 
understanding of the Orthodox faith to prevent them from being tempted into apostasy. 
Its  aims  were,  therefore,  predominantly  educational  in  the  beginning.   Moreover,  it 
sought to utilize some of the very same methods that brought Radstock success, such as 
Bible  readings  and  discussions,  prayer  meetings,  and  lectures—all  outside  regular 
church services.  However, the motives were far from merely defensive; the Society 
quickly came to embody the new sense of social mission developed by the clergy and 
Academy in Petersburg.  Its first goal was to spread the Gospel message by means of 
lectures and discussion, but the Society also sought to demonstrate and exemplify how 
Christ’s teachings were to be lived out. Ultimately it endeavored to transform the life of 
Russian society as well as the lives of individual believers.28  
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The Society developed gradually from modest beginnings in the 1880s to much 
more expanded activities and membership by the 1890s and early twentieth century. It 
sponsored weekly lectures in a dozen locations in the center of Petersburg that were 
attended by an average of one hundred to three hundred listeners, though lectures in 
larger halls could attract as many as 1,500.  It gradually expanded its activities to reach 
working-class districts further from the center of the city. In 1887, Antonii (Vadkovskii, 
1846-1912) became rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and supported the 
work of SMRE by encouraging students of the academy to participate.29  The Society 
promoted cooperation among the capital’s clergy by holding weekly meetings for those 
involved in its work to discuss methods and approaches, and these meetings broadened 
their focus to include pressing moral and intellectual issues of concern to contemporary 
society  as  well  as  the  Church.  Such discussions  prepared  the  clergy  for  a  series  of 
lectures on topics such as Christian views of war, literature, family life, and the modern 
world more broadly, which were delivered in 1902 and aimed at the intelligentsia.30
Between 1890 and 1906, the Society for Moral-Religious Enlightenment grew 
rapidly and its activities further diversified.   At the turn of the century, it had amateur 
choirs and libraries, schools for children, Sunday literacy schools for adults, organized a 
Religious-Educational Union for women involved in teaching and hospital visitations, 
and opened a youth section for students of institutions of higher education.  The Society 
also developed an impressive array of publications, including its own weekly journal, S. 
Peterburgskii dukhovnyi vestnik (The St. Petersburg Ecclesiastical Herald), founded in 
1895,  as  well  as  religious  pamphlets  that  were  printed  in  the  tens  of  thousands. 
Membership ranged between 1,300 and 1,500 people in the early years of the twentieth 
century. By 1906, forty-one percent of the members were laymen and laywomen, most 
of whom were teachers in the Sunday schools,  choir  directors,  or  involved in youth 
outreach.  According to Hedda, the active involvement of the laity was crucial to the 
success  of  the  Society.  The  Society  aimed  to  bring  the  Church  into  the  world  by 
involving the public and bringing together people from all levels of society, rather than 
remaining  exclusively  a  clerical  organization.   Its  ability  to  attract  lay  activists,  in 
addition to those who attended its lectures and meetings, suggests that the ideals of the 
Petersburg  clergy  resonated  with  believers  from  different  social  groups  who  were 
dedicated to the same vision.31
Mission to the Working Class
While  the  Society  for  Moral-Religious  Enlightenment  initially  focused  on 
education  and  directed  its  efforts  toward  educated  society,  its  focus  was  quickly 
redirected toward Petersburg’s working-class population.  Because of assumptions about 
the Church’s subordination to the state and its inability to develop its own independent 
political and social views, historians have typically portrayed the Church’s involvement 
29
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with the working class as aimed strictly at “ideological pacification.” In an oft-quoted 
passage,  Fr.  Filosof  Ornatskii,  the  head  of  the  SMRE,  called  on  clergy  to  oppose 
“criminal propaganda” with “permanent preaching of the Christian ideas of obedience, 
submissiveness,  order  and  legality”  during  the  strikes  of  1896.32 Thus,  Gerald  Surh 
argued that “the Church failed by and large to address itself to the social dimensions of 
workers’ needs.”33 Rather, the Church supposedly taught submissiveness and obedience 
to authorities, and taught workers to “heed their own sins” rather than seek to improve 
their material situation.  As a result, its missionary efforts “served as vehicles for the 
propagation  of  traditional  and  conservative  religious  views  and for  the  suppression, 
rather  than  the  encouragement,  of  worker  self-organization.”34 In  the  light  of  recent 
research, such assumptions need to be dramatically revised: while government officials 
no doubt wished to use religion as a means of social control,35 the Church’s motivations 
were much more complex and varied and included a real defense of workers’ interests.36
In pre-Reform Russia, according to Gregory Freeze, the Orthodox Church felt 
secure with its position in the cities and focused its efforts on the village, where the 
peasantry—though pious—needed to be educated in a conscious understanding of the 
faith.   In  the  post-Reform period (when Russia  experienced massive  urban growth), 
however, this situation reversed; the Church came to identify more with the village, and 
regarded  the  city  with  antipathy,  feeling  alienated  not  only  from  the  radical 
intelligentsia, but from educated society as a whole.  Increasingly, ecclesiastical leaders 
also grew concerned with signs of dechristianization and moral decline among the lower 
classes, especially factory workers.37 Page Herrlinger has noted that the clergy had a 
32
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rather formulaic understanding of workers and their moral decline: young men went to 
the city to find work; there, disconnected from the village community and its ties to the 
parish, they were corrupted by bad influences (which, in turn, they sometimes brought 
back  with  them to  the  village).  Church  leaders  viewed  urban  culture  as  inherently 
corrupt,  and  the  factory environment itself  as  spiritually  dangerous  because  workers 
were  overworked  and  exhausted,  having  little  free  time  and  even  less  energy  for 
religious duties.38  “It  is no secret,” according to S. N. Runkevich of the Petersburg 
Theological Academy, “that factory workers,  exhausted by continuous work,  rush to 
seek out amusement in their free time to make up for the labor that buries them daily, 
and that holidays, which are days off at factories, turn into days of revelry [razgul] for 
the majority.”39 This resulted, according to the clergy, in excessive drinking; not only did 
taverns pull workers away from churches, but drunkenness also led to further immoral 
behavior.40  In addition to the burdens of factory work and the temptations of urban 
diversions, clergy recognized that most of the workers lived in new parts of the city in 
which there was a shortage of churches. Workers were absent from church, therefore, for 
a variety of reasons. 
Clergy feared that this disconnection from the Church would result in a further 
decline of workers’  understanding of the faith,  which they regarded as “the primary 
threat  to  the  spiritual  health  of  urban  workers.”41  Lacking  an  understanding  of 
Orthodoxy,  clergy  feared  that  workers  would  be  subject  to  various  temptations, 
including sectarian movements such as the Pashkovites. Nevertheless, in contrast to the 
intelligentsia  (who  consciously  rejected  the  faith),  the  Church  regarded  workers  as 
members of the traditional narod (“folk”), vulnerable and corrupted by the influences of 
the city, but still redeemable—rather than as members of a new social class that was 
irredeemably  alienated  from  the  Church  (and  indeed  the  majority  were  recent  or 
temporary migrants from the village).  Since ignorance of and disconnection from the 
Church were regarded as the roots of workers’ spiritual problems, clergy believed that 
the salvation of workers lay through their fulfillment of traditional obligations, such as 
attending church services and fasting, but even more through religious education and 
spreading the Word of God.42 
The Petersburg clergy’s emphasis on teaching and preaching the Word of God as 
the cure for the spiritual ills of the city’s workers inspired the work of the Society for 
Moral-Religious  Enlightenment.   As  its  activities  more  grew  directed  towards  the 
mission among the factory workers, the SMRE developed a vast network of its own 
churches,  schools,  and  libraries;  an  extensive  program of  lectures  and  tea  rooms in 
working-class  districts  of  the  capital;  and  the  publication  of  books  and  pamphlets 
directed at a popular audience. The work was aided particularly by the participation of 
students from the Theological Academy, who were primarily involved in lecturing and 
preaching.  In  1899 students  from the  Academy,  for  example,  began lecturing at  the 
Vargunin  paper  factory  on  themes  such  as  Biblical  and  Church  history,  Scriptural 
Late Imperial Russia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 215-32.
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interpretation, and the explanation of the liturgy.  The Society’s most popular lectures 
focused on lives of the saints and Biblical stories. Large numbers of workers flocked to 
the lectures, which had a positive effect as evidenced by higher levels of worker church 
attendance together with fasting, confession, and communion .43 
 The  Society’s  efforts  met  with  great  successes.   In  1887-88,  some  50,000 
workers came to 161 lectures in all parts of the capital, and by 1903-04 over two million 
people attended 6,000 lectures in 80 locations.  Workers themselves frequently initiated 
the establishment of a lecture series. In the working-class district of Peskov, residents 
rented out a  room for 60 rubles a  month to  establish a  program of lectures.  On the 
opening night, 350 people attended, including many workers still in their work clothes, 
having rushed directly from work.44  In 1898, workers of the Shtiglitz factory held a 
ceremony  to  bid  farewell  to  two  student-lecturers  from  the  Theological  Academy; 
workers gathered in great numbers, a chorus of 100 workers opened the ceremony, and 
the  main  address  was  given  by  a  worker  who expressed  his  deep  gratitude  for  the 
students’ efforts.45
Despite  the  successes  of  the  Society  for  Moral-Religious  Enlightenment,  its 
mission to the workers faced great challenges. The rapid growth of the city, particularly 
of industrial quarters on the outskirts of the city, outpaced the growth of churches and 
number of clergy.  Parish clergy frequently complained that, during peak periods such as 
Great  Lent  in  particular,  they  were  simply  unable  to  devote  sufficient  time  to  the 
hundreds that came to each of them for confession. As the population of St. Petersburg 
more than doubled to 2.2 million between 1881 and 1914, only 85 new churches were 
built, and many of these were private or institutional chapels. The Church lacked funds 
to  construct new church buildings.  The social  conditions of the capital,  in  particular 
workers’ transience, were also significant hindrances.   Not only were the majority of 
workers  (around  70  percent)  temporary  peasant-migrants,  but  even  those  who  were 
permanent residents frequently moved within the city.  Further, the Orthodox Church 
had no formal system of registering parishioners, and Petersburg in particular developed 
no  clearly  defined  parishes.  As  a  result,  parish  priests  were  severely  challenged  in 
establishing any sense of parish community or developing a relationship with their flock. 
The situation had further consequences on workers’ moral lives: law required priests to 
announce a marriage in the parish of the bride and groom, and clergy frequently found it 
difficult to determine whether the people involved were in fact their parishioners.  The 
Church was even accused of refusing to marry workers.46  In response to these needs and 
problems, the SMRE in particular worked to establish new churches in working-class 
districts, though the pace still lagged behind need.47
The  structure  of  factory  life,  such  as  strained  living  conditions  and  the 
indifference  or  resistance of  factory owners,  was  also a  significant  challenge to  the 
43
 Herrlinger, “Class, Piety, and Politics,” 82-89.
44
 Herrlinger, “Orthodoxy and Factory Life,” 55; see Herrlinger, “Class, Piety, and 
Politics,” 90-94, and Hedda, “Good Shepherds,” 257-61. 
45
 Herrlinger, “Class, Piety, and Politics,” 97.
46
 Simon Dixon, “The Orthodox Church and the Workers of St Petersburg, 1880-1914,” 
in Hugh McLeod (ed.), European Religion in the Age of Great Cities, 1830-1930 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 119-41.
47
 Herrlinger, “Class, Piety and Politics,” 111-12.
12
Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe, Volume I (May 2006)
Church’s mission to the workers. In some factories, paternalistic industrialists promoted 
active participation in church life. The Vargunin paper factory, for example, had its own 
church, parish school, choir, library, shelter for the poor, and Sunday school.  In a few 
cases, such as the Izhorsk ironworks, the parish clergy were part of the administrative 
staff and retained close ties to the workers, though workers who failed to attend church 
could be reported and fined. Such factories were, however, the minority in Petersburg.48 
Russian industrialists had an ambivalent attitude towards Orthodoxy. Some saw it as a 
useful  means  of  maintaining  social  harmony and combating  dissent,  but  others  saw 
traditional  Orthodox  practice  as  a  hindrance  to  modern  industrial  development  and 
preferred to promote secular education. In 1870, Ludwig Nobel and other industrialists 
complained  that  the  numerous  holidays  (and  the  festivities  that  surrounded  them) 
resulted in low productivity.  In the eyes of revolutionary workers, at least, the clergy 
were suspect for being too closely linked to the state and the capitalists, as opponents of 
labor protest, and even as spies within the factory.49  In reality, however, the Society for 
Moral-Religious Enlightenment often met with lack of support from industrialists, many 
of whom prevented the Society from establishing meetings on factory grounds.  Even 
state-run factories did not allow the Society’s preaching circles into the factory until 
1900.50  The state belatedly came to the Church’s support when the Ministry of Finance 
issued a circular to factory inspectorates that Orthodoxy clergy were to be allowed free 
access to conduct lectures in the factory.51  On the whole, clergy felt that industrialists 
hampered,  rather  than  assisted,  their  mission  to  the  workers.  Most  industrialists 
neglected religious life in the factory.  Even some of the larger factories did not have 
their own churches, and some employers demanded work on Sundays and holidays.52  In 
the same article in response to the 1896 strikes in which he called for the preaching of 
obedience and submissiveness, Fr. Ornatskii criticized industrialists for neglecting both 
the material and spiritual needs of workers and blamed them for the growth of labor 
unrest.53  
In short, the obstacles to the Church’s mission to the working class were many. 
Herrlinger argues that the Church’s insistence on regarding the workers as the same 
narod as  the  peasants,  rather  than  considering  the  distinctiveness  of  working-class 
identity, caused it to misunderstand and incorrectly address working-class life.  While 
both  Dixon  and  Herrlinger  conclude  (no  doubt  because  of  the  ultimate  triumph  of 
Revolution both in 1905 and especially in 1917) that, as a result of external and internal 
obstacles,  the  Church’s  mission  to  the  working  class  was  a  failure,  its  significant 
achievements should not be overlooked.54 
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The Alexander-Nevskii Temperance Society
As the Petersburg clergy became more involved in the mission to the factory 
workers, they grew increasingly aware of the damaging effects of alcohol abuse.  In the 
post-Reform era, the Church began to combat the problem of drunkenness among the 
clergy itself as well  as among the peasantry, and from the 1880s rural priests began 
founding temperance groups in the village.  While some clergy were involved in efforts 
to form temperance societies in the late 1850s, the state’s fiscal interests in its alcohol 
monopoly led it to discourage the Church from advocating abstinence.  Only in 1889 did 
the state itself begin to address the problem of alcoholism, and in the same year the Holy 
Synod formally encouraged clergy to engage in temperance activities. Many clergy of 
St.  Petersburg, as elsewhere in the Empire, responded immediately, and by 1900 the 
Church  had  261  temperance  organizations.55  The  Society  for  Moral-Religious 
Enlightenment became involved in temperance work in 1891.  The pivotal moment came 
in  1898,  when  Fr.  Aleksandr  Rozhdestvenskii  founded  the  Alexander-Nevskii 
Temperance Society.  Fr. Rozhdestvenskii (1872-1905), like the priests Grigorii Petrov 
and  Georgii  Gapon  (see  below),  came  to  study  at  the  St.  Petersburg  Theological 
Academy in the 1890s in part “to become acquainted with the many thousands of poor 
working  people  in  the  capital,  to  whom… he was already drawn [by the  desire]  to 
serve.”56  As a student-preacher for the SMRE, he lectured in various factories; after his 
graduation in 1897, he became a priest at the Society’s church at Warsaw station where 
he became very involved in ministering to workers.  Through his ministry, he came into 
contact  with  a  group  of  workers  who  requested  his  help  in  giving  up  drinking,  in 
response to which he founded the Nevskii Society.  He believed that drunkenness was 
itself a vice that separated one from God, but it also weakened one morally and led to 
more  serious  sins  and  affected  the  lives  of  family  members.   Fr.  Rozhdestvenskii 
believed that the first task for the clergy was one of enlightenment: to publicize the 
dangers  of  alcohol  and  combat  the  social  acceptance  of  drunkenness.   Once  an 
individual became convinced of the need to give up alcohol, he would next take a pledge 
of sobriety.57 
Sobriety pledges were a customary part of temperance societies in Russia and 
consisted of swearing an oath to abstain at least for a set period of time, and of signing a 
certificate.  The society offered its members the support they needed to stay sober and 
guide them in a new way of  life.   Members met  twice a  week in small  groups for 
reading, prayer and discussion, as well as attending church services on Sundays.  There 
were also monthly general meetings of the Society, and several times a year the Society 
organized pilgrimages to holy sites outside Petersburg.   The Nevskii  Society rapidly 
expanded: 10,000 joined in the first year and a half, and by 1905 the Society had 75,000 
members.  It established ten divisions in different parts of the city by 1906.  A cleric, 
aided by lay assistants, headed each division. Each lay assistant was responsible for a 
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certain number of pledges; these assistants, numbering 400 by 1906, attended training 
sessions that instructed them how “to act toward their weaker brothers not as spies or 
policemen but as brothers and sisters of mercy.”58 The assistants visited those in their 
charge for encouragement and support.59  
As the Nevskii Society expanded, it also established four schools, two technical 
schools,  libraries,  and  a  printing  press;  in  addition,  it  had  an  array  of  “temperance 
tearooms” where it received new members as well as sponsored lectures and discussions. 
The Society’s publishing activities rapidly expanded; by 1905, it printed nearly 800,000 
copies of books and pamphlets.60 The moral vision that inspired Fr. Rozhdestvenskii and 
other clergy who participated in the Society attracted wide support of the laity, from 
thousands of workers who made pledges to hundreds of educated laity who contributed 
by their activism to wealthy supporters who donated money.  While the clergy organized 
and directed the Society’s work, the support of the laity was instrumental in its success. 
This  cooperation  of  clergy  and  laity,  according  to  Hedda,  “suggests  that  these  two 
groups were not as alienated and estranged” as is usually assumed by historians. The 
clergy saw the suffering of their flock and the social problems that ailed them and strove 
to  ameliorate  their  condition.  While  the  clergy,  naturally,  perceived  problems 
predominantly in moral terms, they understood that the workers’ moral condition was 
related to their material circumstances.  Their efforts, ultimately, were concerned not 
only  with  individuals,  but  aimed to  create  a  sense  of  Christian  community  through 
preaching the Gospel and applying its principles in action.  Much of the success of the 
movement was due to the charisma of Fr. Rozhdestvenskii, and when he died suddenly 
in July 1905 thousands of workers came out to mourn him.61 Not all clergymen were 
dedicated to the cause of temperance, however, because an excessive puritanism was 
suspected of sectarianism. Indeed, when the lay temperance activist Ivan Churikov and 
his  followers  gained  a  massive  following,  the  Church  hierarchy  condemned  the 
movement as sectarianism despite its protestations of Orthodoxy.62 
Working-Class Religious Life
Until  recently,  most  historians—Western  as  well  as  Soviet—assumed  that 
secularization  was the  inevitable  result  of  industrialization.  Only those workers  who 
experienced a “deconversion” from religious belief to atheism (and, generally, Social 
Democracy) were regarded as “true,” “conscious” workers, while those who continued 
to adhere to traditional religious practices were viewed as “backwards,” essentially still 
peasants. Worker-biographies, written in the early Soviet period, were used to show the 
spread  of  atheism  among  workers  in  late  Imperial  Russia.  However,  even  these 
autobiographies, such as that of the worker-revolutionary Semen Kanatchikov—while 
showing the alienation of many workers from religion—reveal that rejection of religion 
was not the norm, that Orthodox culture remained dominant.63 Recent research suggests 
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that working-class religious life was much more complex than previously assumed, that 
there was intense interest in religion (sectarian as well as Orthodox), and that religious 
symbols and imagery remained powerful even for revolutionary workers.64
To  begin  with,  religious  participation  among  workers  remained  fairly  high. 
According to an ethnographic study conducted in the 1920s, 70 percent of male workers 
and 85 percent of female workers attended church before 1917.65  Workers continued to 
observe  the  major  sacraments  that  marked  the  Orthodox  Christian’s  life,  including 
baptism,  weddings,  and  funerals.   These  ceremonies  were  often  adapted  to  new 
circumstances. Thus, while village funerals and weddings were complex and elaborate 
events, lasting several days, in a factory setting they might be reduced to the church 
ceremony itself—so that, in fact, the Orthodox rite became more central there than in the 
village.  Most workers also attended church services for the major feasts, and few failed 
to perform the basic religious duties of at least annual confession and communion, for 
which they prepared with a strict regime of fasting.  Sunday observance, however, was 
less consistent. Female workers and those with closer ties to the village tended to be 
more observant. Lack of free time, the exhaustion of factory work, and the absence of 
nearby parishes were obstacles to regular church attendance. While church attendance 
may  have  been  difficult  for  many  workers,  they  found  alternative  expressions  for 
religious  participation;  in  many ways  the  factory  shop  acted  as  a  substitute  for  the 
village community.  The religious life of the shop was often centered on the shop icon: 
the workday frequently began with singing prayers before the shop icon, and workers 
donated their money to purchase icons or lamp oil.66
 The efforts of the Society for Moral-Religious Enlightenment and the Aleksandr 
Nevskii Temperance Society, according to Herrlinger, had a significant impact on urban 
religious life.  She cites the example of the Petersburg worker A. P. Shapovalov who, in 
the late 1880s and early 1890s, became involved in the temperance movement as much 
for the community and an alternative to the routines of factory labor as for his struggles 
with alcohol.   He grew close to a group of workers who became very involved in the 
Church.  “My friends and I spent all of our free time attending church services [and] 
reading the Bible and the lives of the saints.  We rigidly observed fasts, and all our 
money—the half-kopecks which we were able to spare—was handed over for icons and 
to the church.”67  Despite long hours and six-day weeks, they observed the weekend 
cycle of services, including Saturday evening vigil  and Sunday morning liturgy,  and 
spent Sunday afternoons attending lectures by local clergy and gathering afterward for 
religious discussions.  Shapovalov became an activist,  believing in the “possibility of 
realizing the ancient Christian ideal [of a world] free from [wealth] and [poverty].”68 
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His experience attests to the evolution of a new type of urban believer within the 
working population. Having committed himself to sobriety and joined an active 
community of believers, his spiritual routine actually became more intense and 
diversified  than  ever  before.  At  the  same  time,  he  took  advantage  of  the 
expanding network of opportunities for ‘religious enlightenment’ offered by the 
urban missionaries. As a result, he became more knowledgeable about scripture 
and more conscious of his Orthodox identity.69 
Indeed,  the  activities of  the SMRE and temperance societies  appealed to  a  growing 
number of workers who spent free time discussing religious questions and who had an 
active desire to learn more about their faith, as witnessed by the enormous numbers of 
attendees of the SMRE lectures.70  
Contrary to Surh’s assertion that the organizations of the Church’s urban mission 
served  to  suppress  rather  than  encourage  worker  self-organization,  these  religious 
organizations  fostered  a  sense  of  collective  worker  identity.   Pilgrimages  and  icon 
processions, choirs, tearooms and discussion groups brought workers together, both for 
devotion and for socializing, and formed one of the few means for workers to gather 
outside the workplace.  Indeed, religious issues often provided the grounds for some of 
the earliest labor disputes, particularly over work on religious holidays. A law of June 
1897 reduced the number  of  legal  holidays and cut  out  a  number of popular  feasts, 
which led to strikes in several of Petersburg’s large factories—with such strength that 
employers were forced to grant concessions. In another instance, a factory’s refusal to 
allow a worker a day off  to baptize his ill  infant,  who died without being baptized, 
sparked unrest in the factory.  In sum, the organizations and activities provided by the 
Church for the workers acted as vehicles for the organization of collective participation 
among workers as well as encouraging an increased involvement in the Church.71
Father Grigorii Petrov (1867-1925)
The clergy of St. Petersburg, through its missionary outreach and organizations 
like the Society for Moral-Religious Enlightenment, sought to transform the lives of 
their flock through teaching the Gospel and guiding people in living it in their lives.  Not 
simply concerned with individuals, they tried to create a sense of Orthodox community 
among the workers.  While hoping to have an impact on society, their efforts remained 
focused  on  teaching  and  moral  transformation.   By  the  1890s,  however,  a  new 
generation of clergy entered the Church’s service through the Petersburg Theological 
Academy and work in the SMRE and, because of their close contacts with the working 
classes  and  their  difficult  conditions,  embraced  a  vision  that  went  beyond  their 
predecessors.  These younger clerics of the 1890s sought to transform society not only 
morally, but materially; not just to create a sense of Orthodox community among the 
workers through their organizations, but to transform society through political and social 
action—which, they believed, would lead to the transformation of the world into the 
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Kingdom of God.72 
One of the most well known of these priests was Fr. Grigorii Petrov, who served 
as chaplain of an artillery school in Petersburg in the 1890s.  Born of a non-clerical 
family, Petrov chose to become a priest out of an intense calling. As a student at the 
Petersburg  Theological  Academy (1887-91),  he  preached and taught  for  the SMRE. 
Petrov became famous with the publication in 1898 of a little book entitled Evangelie  
kak osnova zhizni (The Gospel as the Foundation of Life), which went through seventeen 
editions by 1905.  He followed this success with a number of essays and stories that 
popularized the idea of the Christian who was involved in society.  While his stories 
were  intended  for  a  popular  audience,  Petrov  also  reached  out  to  the  intelligentsia, 
giving a  series  of  lectures  in  1902-1903,  and  later  hosting gatherings  of  clergy  and 
intelligentsia that included people like Sergei Bulgakov.73 Indeed, Gorky enthusiastically 
recommended Petrov and his book to Chekhov:
Soon  I  will  send  you  a  splendid  and  strange  little  book.  Splendid—
[because] in it there is a lot of soul, bright and deeply faithful soul, and strange 
because it was written by a pop [pejorative term for priest], and written in a way 
that priests just don’t write. It’s called The Gospel as the Foundation of Life, its 
author is Grigorii Spiridonov Petrov, a catechism teacher in the artillery academy 
and among various grand princes. He’s still a young fellow and—how splendid 
he is! How much faith is in this person, pure childlike faith! He’s the son of a 
tavern-keeper  or  barman  and  in  childhood  heard  nothing  but  cursing,  saw 
nothing but drunks. And now—he’s a torch pure and bright—isn’t it great?74
Chekhov later met Petrov and read the book, which he also liked and recommended to 
others.75
The main focus of Petrov’s book on the Gospel as the Foundation of Life was the 
notion of the Kingdom of God.  In contrast to the focus of Russian Orthodox teaching 
since the eighteenth century, which interpreted the Kingdom of God in terms of heaven 
to be attained in the life to come, Petrov argued that the Kingdom of God was “perfect 
life on earth—life based not on the dominion of force,  of crude egoism, but  on the 
principles of universal love, full justice, the recognition of all the legitimate rights of 
persons… The Kingdom of God is the just, morally perfect life of people on earth, life 
awakened  by  Christ  the  Savior  and  structured  according  to  His  evangelical 
commands.”76  For  Petrov,  like  American  Social-Gospel  theologians  such  as 
Rauschenbusch, the Kingdom of God was something to be realized in history in the 
world.  He conceded that it might never be fully attained on earth, but it was an ideal to 
which  humanity  could  strive,  continually  perfecting  human  society  and  life.   He 
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criticized  contemporary  social  conditions,  and  also  Social  Darwinist  and  materialist 
approaches that promoted selfish competition and perpetuated injustice. Progress in the 
sciences, technology, and secular thought had not solved humanity’s social ills.  These 
problems could only be solved through love, through the moral regeneration of society.77
In many of Petrov’s subsequent  articles and stories, he focused on individual 
transformation and participation in moral action.  He thought that the starting point to 
eliminate injustice in the world was to eradiate it from the hearts of individuals, and 
therefore focused his attention on individual moral improvement.  His stories presented 
models of individuals (clergy and laity) who were sober, active, self-reliant, responsible, 
reasonable, and liberal.  They participated in individual and group Bible study, and took 
the initiative in performing charity.78  By 1902-1903, Petrov turned his interests away 
from individual moral improvement directed at common people, toward a reconciliation 
of clergy and intelligentsia.   He argued that the clergy and the intelligentsia aspired 
toward the same goals: to establish society on the basis of truth and justice, to create a 
better  life  for  the  common people.   They  should,  therefore,  overcome their  mutual 
suspicions and work together.  Petrov believed that the clergy knew the lives and needs 
of  the  common  people  better  than  the  intelligentsia,  and  their  experience  through 
ministry and charitable activities could benefit the intelligentsia.  At the same time, the 
intelligentsia  had  more  experience  and  understanding  of  political  action  and  public 
service, from which the clergy could learn. Other clergy also shared Petrov’s interest in 
the intelligentsia, with whom they sought a rapprochement at the turn of the century—
most notably in the activities of the St. Petersburg Religious Philosophical Society.79
Petrov began to argue, particularly during the 1905 Revolution, that the only way 
to actualize the Kingdom of God on earth was through political action,  and that the 
clergy needed to enter the political arena and side with those who called for reform.  He 
himself  joined  the  Kadet  Party  (Constitutional  Democrats,  the  party  of  the  liberal 
intelligentsia), and was elected as one of their deputies to the Second Duma in 1906. 
Petrov believed that the political goals of the liberal intelligentsia were compatible with 
the moral ideals of the Church. At the same time he did not want to leave politics to the 
liberals,  but  felt  the Church should play a  leading  role.   He further  argued that  the 
Church should be independent from the state, for only then could it act as a vital force in 
social reform.  The Church did not need the state’s support and protection, for the state 
was only using the Church for its own purposes.  Moreover, if the Church declared its 
independence and sided with the forces for social  change,  the government would be 
forced to change.80
Georgii Gapon (1870-1906) and the Assembly of Russian Workers
It  is  now  possible  to  contextualize  Fr.  Georgii  Gapon  in  his  religious  and 
ecclesiastical  setting.  The  Petersburg  clergy  generally  opposed  the  revolutionary 
movement and preached obedience and order in the face of labor unrest.  At the same 
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time, those involved in the mission to the working-class became acutely aware that the 
labor question had a material as well as a spiritual dimension, and felt frustrated that the 
conditions  of  factory  labor  made  religious  commitment  difficult.  In  short,  they 
recognized  that  for  Orthodoxy to  have  an  impact  on  workers,  the  clergy  needed to 
acknowledge their poverty and the social injustice of their condition.  Simon Dixon has 
argued that 1905 did not mark the beginning of the Church’s social involvement, but 
rather  the  moment  when its  “inner  contradictions”  were  exposed  and  its  social  and 
political involvement began to fragment. “The boundary between philanthropy within 
the existing system and the implicit advocacy of more systematic social and political 
reform is not easy to distinguish,” but by 1905 “it had certainly been crossed.”81 The 
men who founded the SMRE were certainly no political subversives, but the younger 
generation of clergy such as Petrov and Gapon operated in a different atmosphere and 
advocated a more radical position than their elders, at least implicitly. These two priests, 
together  with  others,  drew  attention  to  social  injustice  and  made  politically  radical 
statements for their time and positions. Bloody Sunday, however, brought out into the 
open political positions implicit in the Church’s earlier pastoral work.82
Portrayals of Fr. Gapon have been very polarized.  The most extensive study, by 
Walter  Sablinsky,  did  not  ignore  the  fact  that  Gapon  was  a  priest.   Yet  Sablinsky 
emphasized  other  influences—such  as  Tolstoy  and  socialist  revolutionaries—in  the 
formation  of  his  social  mission,  and  portrayed  him  only  in  a  negative,  critical 
relationship  to  the  Church.  From  the  perspective  of  the  developing  vision  of  the 
pastorate in post-Reform St. Petersburg, most of Gapon’s ideals and even actions were 
consistent with his contemporaries in the Church like Petrov, with the exception that 
Gapon  took them one  step  further—with  tragic  consequences.   To  fully  understand 
Gapon, he must be placed in this religious context.  Like Petrov, Gapon was not from a 
clerical family: his father was a Ukrainian Cossack, and his mother a peasant. While he 
was critical of his mother’s ritualism and attachment to external elements of the Church, 
the models of heroic self-sacrifice he found both in Cossack stories and saints’ lives 
shaped his own life.  As a boy in school, he caught the attention of a local priest, who 
arranged for him to go to seminary.  There he came into contact with Tolstoy’s radical 
anarchist and pacifist critique of established Church and state, and decided not to enter 
the priesthood.  His future wife, however, convinced him that becoming a priest was the 
best means of serving the people.  He was married and ordained in Poltava, and quickly 
attracted large congregations by his preaching, despite the fact that it was a cemetery 
church, not a regular parish.  After his wife died, he decided to enter the St. Petersburg 
Theological  Academy  in  1898.  At  the  Academy,  Gapon  became  involved  in  the 
missionary work of the Society of Moral-Religious Enlightenment, though he resigned 
after the Society rejected a project for a mutual-aid society for workers he devised.83  
Gapon never  devoted  his  energies entirely  to  his  studies,  preferring to  throw 
himself into his missionary work.  Throughout his life, he seemed to combine idealism 
with  ambitious  plans  to  realize  his  ideals.  Strong-headed,  he  attracted  the  positive 
attention both of those he served and of those in high places, while alienating his co-
workers. In the fall of 1899 the Director General of the Holy Synod, Vladimir Sabler, 
81
 Dixon, “Church, State and Society,” 421. 
82
 Dixon, “Church, State and Society,” 421-26.
83
 Hedda, “Good Shepherds,” 366-80; Sablinsky, Road, 34-45.
20
Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe, Volume I (May 2006)
invited him to participate in missionary work in a church located in a port area of St. 
Petersburg, one of the poorest working-class districts. Pobedonostsev and Sabler headed 
the  charity  society  of  the  parish  itself.   The  missionary  work,  conducted  under  the 
auspices of the SMRE, entailed giving lectures and leading discussion groups among 
workers in industrial plants and shipyards.  Gapon’s lectures and sermons became very 
popular, drawing large crowds of workers; even Pobedonostsev came to hear him speak. 
Once again, Gapon was not satisfied with his level of activity and devised a plan to 
establish a large-scale mutual-aid society for the workers, which also did not receive 
approval because the authorities regarded it as redundant.  He then accepted a position at 
an orphanage, and continued to attract large crowds to the services, not only because of 
his sermons, but also because of his expressive style of conducting the services.  He was 
very  popular  among  the  working  classes,  and  gained  a  reputation  for  his  personal 
generosity, even giving away his own boots to a vagrant. He soon began to devise more 
ambitious  plans  to  reach  the  city’s  criminals  and  unemployed  through  a  system of 
workhouses, which would support moral improvement and develop work skills.  In his 
expressive  style  of  serving  the  liturgy,  personal  generosity,  and  his  plans  for 
workhouses, Gapon is reminiscent of John of Kronstadt, despite his own criticisms of Fr. 
John’s “complete neglect of any radical proposals for the betterment of the condition of 
the suffering and toiling masses.”84 Gapon neglected his  work at  the orphanage and 
alienated its directors, so that he was dismissed in 1902 and his scheme for workhouses 
was denied; he also failed to take his examinations at the Academy, and would have 
been expelled but for the personal intervention of Metropolitan Antonii.85
In the fall of 1902, Gapon came to the attention of the head of the secret police, 
Sergei Zubatov.  Zubatov, recognizing Gapon’s popularity among the workers, sought to 
enlist him in his project to found a workers’ organization in St. Petersburg along the 
lines of those he had already established in Moscow and other cities.  Zubatov planned 
to organize the workers under police control to keep out revolutionary elements.  Gapon, 
according to his own account, did not fully embrace Zubatov’s plan, and stayed on the 
sidelines.  After Zubatov fell from grace in August 1903 as a result of his organization’s 
involvement in a strike in Odessa, Gapon stepped in to pick up the pieces and found a 
new organization.  The Assembly of Russian Factory and Mill Workers began meeting 
in the same month.  By October, Gapon presented to authorities a draft statute and a 
justification for the Assembly’s existence.  He criticized the Zubatovist organizations for 
excessive police involvement, and argued that his organization, while clearly loyal to the 
government under his direction, would be more effective as a workers’ organization.  As 
it was to be explicitly a workers’ organization, it was also distinguished from the Society 
for  Moral-Religious  Enlightenment.   At  the  same  time,  its  activities  resembled  the 
SMRE much more than that of a labor union: they focused on lectures, concerts, and 
other  activities  directed  at  the  cultural  development  and  moral  improvement  of  the 
workers rather than seeking to intervene in labor disputes.  The Assembly was officially 
accepted by the Ministry of the Interior in February 1904.  The authorities placed a great 
deal of trust in Gapon as a priest,  and granted the Assembly a significant degree of 
autonomy. The Assembly began to advocate a more active political program by the end 
of 1904, and entered into the political fray on 3 January by calling a strike of the Putilov 
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factory workers—an action Gapon felt compelled to take if the Assembly was not to lose 
its authority to defend workers’ interests.  This strike spread to other major industries—
in the midst of the Russo-Japanese war—and the strikers made broad demands for better 
working conditions.  It was to address this situation that the fateful march on 9 January 
was planned.  
Both  Church  and  state  authorities  supported  Gapon’s  Assembly.  Until  the 
organization turned political at the end of 1904, Gapon’s scheme was very much in 
keeping with the model of the Church’s missions to the working classes in St. Petersburg 
and was supported by the Church precisely as an effective means of  extending that 
mission.  Official support of Gapon’s Assembly rested, to a large degree, precisely on 
the fact that he was a priest.  His clerical status allowed the authorities to trust him and 
allow  him  to  conduct  his  work.   From  the  Church’s  side,  Metropolitan  Antonii 
(Vadkovskii)  generally  supported  Gapon’s  efforts.  Antonii  had  actively  backed  the 
Church’s urban mission since his time as rector of the Theological Academy, and as 
Metropolitan he recognized Gapon’s abilities with regard to the working class.  He also 
encouraged  Gapon’s  participation  in  the  Petersburg  Religious-Philosophical  Society. 
Antonii backed Gapon’s efforts because he believed that they held great promise for the 
Church’s  mission  to  the  workers.  Being  uncomfortable  with  its  more  explicitly 
economic and social concerns, Antonii declined to become directly involved and warned 
Gapon  against  political  engagement.   The  conversation  Gapon  reports  in  his 
autobiography is instructive of the differences in generational approaches; Gapon reports 
his words to the Metropolitan:
A servant of Christ must show the people, not by words, but by deeds, 
that he is their guide. You cannot deny that the life of our workmen is terrible: 
they have no joy, and therefore they take to drink…. We must also try to better 
their material conditions if we are to help them to a better life. In helping the 
people to help themselves the Church also has a great task. I must say frankly 
that if the Church will not go into the homes of the people, the shepherd will, 
sooner or later, be without sheep. Already nearly the whole of the educated class
—those who have influence with the people—have left the Church; and if we do 
not help the masses now, they also will leave us.
The Metropolitan looked rather shaken, but spoke of the danger to the 
Church of its becoming vulgarized by mixing in political and social struggles. 
“Christ,” he said, “tried to transform the souls of men, and our concern also is 
with the inner life of the people.”86 
Despite his anxiety, Antonii tolerated Gapon’s activities in the Assembly, in part 
because he understood the Assembly as a primarily religious organization.87  Gapon’s 
clerical status also permitted him connections with high-level government officials; in 
particular General I. A. Fullon, the governor of St. Petersburg, consistently supported 
Gapon’s efforts until the very week preceding Bloody Sunday.  Moreover, while Gapon 
succeeded in distancing his organization from direct ties to the police (in contrast to the 
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Zubatovite  organizations),  the  police  were  quite  satisfied  with  the  Assembly’s 
activities.88 
Gapon’s status as a priest, and the religious nature of the Assembly, also proved 
pivotal in the Assembly’s success with such enormous numbers of workers, most of 
whom  were  alienated  by  radical  students,  revolutionary  intelligentsia,  and  social 
democracy.   Contrary to the historiographical stereotype that workers distrusted clergy, 
the workers trusted Gapon precisely because he was a cleric and often came to him with 
personal and family matters, for help in finding work, or to intercede with employers—
all of which he was in a position to do.89 The Assembly’s activities, which resembled the 
popular  activities  of  the  SMRE,  were in  great  demand,  as  workers  “enthusiastically 
became involved in almost anything offered them. The clubhouse was filled during its 
open hours. On Sundays workers would arrive with their entire families and spend the 
day in discussions, lectures, and study groups, not returning home until the evening’s 
entertainment was concluded.”90  The attitudes expressed in the Assembly’s meetings, 
which met with support by both leaders and participants, included loyalty to the tsar, 
antagonism to revolution, and “faith in the possibility of evolving an independent labor 
movement in cooperation with the regime.”91 According to Sablinsky, Gapon had much 
greater contact with and was much closer to the workers than revolutionary students and 
intelligentsia, most of whom were totally taken by surprise when the Putilov strike broke 
out.92 Even revolutionaries themselves recognized Gapon’s appeal to workers because he 
spoke to the common people in a language imbued with sacred power that resonated 
with them.93
Finally, even the Assembly’s turn to political involvement, including the general 
strike and the march to the Winter Palace,  had religious overtones.   While  both the 
authorities and the revolutionaries (and most historians) tended to associate the Church 
with the existing order and to associate revolution with atheism and rejection of the 
Church, both the Petersburg clergy and the majority of workers before 1905 connected 
their faith with their sense of justice and fairness.  As recent research has demonstrated, 
the relationship between the radicalism and religion is  far  more complex than often 
assumed.94  The very language of the petition prepared by Gapon was imbued with a 
religious tone of the search for justice.95  During the meetings conducted by Gapon on 7-
8 January 1905, according to one eyewitness, workers responded to certain provisions of 
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the petition by raising their hands and forming the sign of the cross “in order to indicate 
that these demands were sacred, and voting for them was like swearing a sacred oath.”96 
Other witnesses also attest to the “religious” atmosphere that reigned in the Assembly’s 
meetings on the eve of Bloody Sunday. “The workers were guided” in these Assembly 
meetings, according to the Menshevik S. I. Somov, “not so much by considerations of a 
material nature, as by a purely moral striving to structure everything ‘in a just way’.”97 
Gapon’s  movement  connected  with  those  workers  (the  majority)  who retained  their 
traditional  faith in the tsar and the Church,  and it  gave them a language to express 
aspirations for civil liberties and a better life and the impetus for unprecedented political 
action.98 
The Impact of the 1905 Revolution
The 1905 Revolution was a turning point for the Russian Orthodox Church, as it 
was for Russian society and politics; it brought out both the clergy’s deeper aspirations 
and its internal divisions. Events of 1905 opened the floodgates for discussion about the 
role of the Church in society, which had implications for questions of internal church life 
and reform as well. The period is very complex, and only a brief attempt will be made 
here to touch on threads already discussed.99
The Holy Synod, prompted by Pobedonostsev, made an official pronouncement 
on  14  January  1905,  declaring  Gapon  an  “unworthy  servitor  of  the  Church,”  and 
exhorted people to respect the authorities.  It was only later in the month that Gapon was 
suspended (though he had already fled abroad to escape arrest), and he was defrocked in 
March. Pronouncements made by parish clergy were carefully worded: on the one hand, 
they could not condemn all of Gapon’s activities, which were closely associated with 
their own efforts to reach the working class of the city, but on the other hand they had to 
distance themselves from the disastrous consequences of Bloody Sunday.  The clergy of 
St.  Petersburg  met  in  January  1905 to  discuss  Bloody Sunday;  a  group of  younger 
clergy,  while  condemning Gapon’s final actions,  declared that the Church needed to 
recognize the people’s suffering and respond to it.  They called on the Church to engage 
in and guide secular affairs, and also called for reform within the Church itself. Later 
known as the “Group of Thirty-Two Petersburg Priests,” they continued to meet and 
finally made a public declaration (supported by Metropolitan Antonii), published in mid-
March  in  Tserkovnyi  Vestnik (“Church  Herald,”  the  journal  of  the  Petersburg 
Theological Academy).  The primary concern of these “renovationists” at this stage was 
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to revitalize the Church itself so that it would be able to participate in and lead society 
rather  than  be  left  behind  as  an  obsolete  institution.  The  group  favored  religious 
tolerance and in particular the need for the Church to be independent of the state so that 
it  could  have  an  independent  voice.100 The  article  by  the  “Group  of  Thirty-Two,” 
together  with  the  granting  of  religious  tolerance  in  April  1905,  sparked  intense 
discussion  within  the  Church  on  issues  of  reform.   Even  conservative  hierarchs 
recognized the need for extensive ecclesiastical reform and greater independence from 
the state.101
The  1905  Revolution  brought  out  tensions  that  were  latent  in  the  reform 
movement.  Prior  to  the revolution,  younger  and  older  clergy  in  St.  Petersburg alike 
could support the mission to the workers and some degree of social  reform without 
directly addressing the issue of its political implications. The consequences of Gapon’s 
actions, and the revolutionary outbursts that followed from 1905 to 1907, polarized the 
clergy. Some, such as Fr. John of Kronstadt, condemned the revolutionary movement 
and  embraced  the  forces  of  the  right.  The  liberal  clergy,  such  as  Petrov,  explicitly 
advocated direct support for the revolutionary movement. They feared that the workers 
would quickly become alienated from the Church, and argued that the Church had to get 
involved  to  realize  social  justice.  In  response  to  the  October  Manifesto,  which 
established the Duma, the “Group of Thirty-Two” claimed that the clergy should play a 
role in the electoral process, not to pursue any “class” aims but to educate the people in 
self-government so that their voices could be heard.  The group formed the Union of 
Zealots  for  Church  Renewal,  which  included Petrov,  the  liberal  Academy professor 
Archimandrite  Mikhail  (Semenov),  and  laymen  such  as  Nikolai  Berdiaev,  Sergei 
Bulgakov, and Vasilii Rozanov.  The Union published on church reform and on politics, 
supporting a liberal program of civil rights, democratization, and social justice.102
The majority of clergy, however, were stunned by the events and responded with 
caution.   Ultimately,  they  recoiled  from  the  consequences  of  Gapon’s  actions  and 
advocated a withdrawal from politics. The SMRE clergy argued that the Church must do 
something  to  improve  workers’  material  conditions,  but  not  by  getting  involved  in 
politics. They rejected the efforts of socialists and revolutionaries, arguing that the path 
to justice could not be reached through violence; workers should aim for pravda (justice 
and truth),  not power. They did not hesitate to criticize capitalists for exploiting the 
workers, and still advocated addressing their material needs. The priest Bogoliubov, for 
example, cautioned against sermons that amounted to “supporting the bosses against the 
workers” that would alienate the Church’s flock, advocating rather the reconciliation of 
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both  sides.103 Still  embracing  the  idea  of  building  a  moral,  Christian  society,  they 
preferred  spiritual  to  political  means  and  focused  their  energies  on  the  moral 
regeneration of their flock. Thus, the SMRE responded by continuing its mission; since 
they still regarding the most fundamental problem as one of parish structure, they sought 
to establish more chapels in factories, hold more meetings, and engage parishes more 
actively in charitable activities. While they sought to understand and meet the needs of 
the workers, many individual priests felt unable to meet the challenges raised by the 
revolution and lacked experience in dealing with workers’ culture, which was alien to 
them.104 
During the Revolutionary years of 1905-1907, many of the working class were 
indeed alienated from the Church, demanding that it take a more active stance in defense 
of  their  demands  and  disappointed  that  clergy  continued  to  preach  the  same  old 
“spiritual”  answers.  After  the  revolutionary  years  were  over,  however,  the  situation 
dramatically changed. While  some were permanently  alienated from the Church and 
religion  altogether  and  continued  to  seek  political  and  social  solutions,  many  were 
disillusioned with the results of political struggle and renewed their interest in spiritual 
solutions. They returned, however, with a heightened sense of religious awareness, and 
sought not to simply to “observe” the faith  but to understand it.  Clergy reported an 
intense  interest  in  Scripture  and  religious  ideas.  In  1908,  The  Church  Herald 
(Tserkovnyi vestnik) reported that the people “not only wants to pray, but to understand 
the meaning of that prayer, to live a religious life consciously, and to understand the 
meaning and sense of the religious service.”105 
However, at the same time that the SMRE meetings once again began to attract 
large crowds, the heightened desire for religious understanding led many to be critical of 
the Orthodox Church. Some left the Church altogether for “sectarian” movements such 
as the Baptists and Pashkovtsy, while others were at least attracted by movements on the 
fringes of the Church (such as that led by Ivan Churikov) that seemed to offer more.106 
Orthodox  clergy  apparently  often  held  a  more  condescending  attitude  toward  the 
laboring classes: they regarded workers as unable to read and understand Scripture for 
themselves  and  tolerated  degenerate  behavior  (whether  as  helpless  victims  of  social 
circumstances or simply hopeless sinners); these other movements offered a sense of 
empowerment by demanding true spiritual change.107 In short,  the last  decade of the 
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Empire represented a complex situation. Many left the church altogether. For one, as 
Herrlinger argued, “the clergy’s refusal to engage in the fight for social justice in any 
meaningful  way  contributed  to  a  distancing,  if  not  the  outright  alienation,  of  many 
workers from the Church.”108 Many were searching for spiritual renewal;  some were 
respondent to the Church’s efforts, while others turned to alternatives out of a desire to 
have a more meaningful spiritual life on the basis of Scripture, a sense of self-respect, 
and empowerment that those alternatives offered.
The triumph of reaction in 1907 had a significant impact on the Church.  The 
Synod adopted a very conservative, anti-revolutionary stance.  The most radical clergy, 
including  Petrov  and  Archimandrite  Mikhail,  were  suspended  and,  in  their  specific 
cases, ultimately defrocked as a result of their provocative words and actions.  Clergy 
were  regularly  harassed  by  the  authorities—usually  by  overzealous  and  suspicious 
government authorities and police; many were arrested simply for trying to explain the 
October Manifesto to their flocks. The civil authorities (unlike modern historians) were 
evidently  more  likely  to  regard  clergy  as  potential  subversives  rather  than  loyal 
supporters of the state.109  The liberal voice in the Church—at least with regard to social 
and political issues—was effectively silenced until 1917, only to erupt again after the 
Revolutions of 1917 in a more radical form, particularly in the Renovationist schism of 
the 1920s.110  While most clergy continued to advocate a quieter approach to social and 
moral change through their pastoral work and charity, the minority voices that supported 
the radical right and the conservative position of the Synod served to alienate educated 
society from the Church in the last  years of the empire.   Nevertheless,  the clergy—
including the conservative episcopate itself—grew increasingly disenchanted with the 
government,  in  large  part  because  of  its  intrusive  meddling  in  ecclesiastical  affairs. 
Therefore, during the regime’s final hour, the Church failed to come to the support of the 
monarchy not because of its weakness, as is usually supposed, but because it had lost 
faith in the tsarist regime’s ability to defend and support the needs of the Church and its 
flock.111 
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In the post-Reform era a significant segment of the clergy—particularly in St. 
Petersburg—developed new theological and pastoral tendencies.  These tendencies, as 
articulated in the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, sought to bring the Church into 
the world in order to transform it, to reform it in the image of the Kingdom of God. 
Predominantly envisioned as a moral transformation in the post-Reform era, this new 
theology found practical expression first in parish charities, and later in the Society for 
Moral-Religious Enlightenment and the Alexander-Nevskii Temperance Society. These 
organizations, and others like them, established diverse forms of outreach to the workers 
of St.  Petersburg, from lectures and discussions to tearooms and pilgrimages.  These 
activities  were  extremely  popular  and  were  attended  by  millions  of  workers.  While 
working-class religion was complex and varied—and many workers were attracted to 
trends as diverse as heavy drinking, sectarianism, and socialism—a significant portion 
remained devoted to Orthodoxy and became actively and consciously involved in the 
new forms of religious expression offered by the Church.  
As a result of their close contact with the workers and their hardships, a vocal 
and active minority  of  clergy,  such as Petrov and Gapon,  came to advocate a  more 
radical program of political and social change in Russia by the early twentieth century. 
While not unique in his outlook, Gapon took his ideas furthest in action by forming a 
workers’ organization; this organization began very much like the SMRE, but ultimately 
took a more direct role in labor disputes and the political demonstration of 9 January 
1905.  Bloody Sunday revealed the inherent tensions within the Church itself, while at 
the same time giving impetus for wide-sweeping demands for Church reform and greater 
independence of the Church from the state. There has not been sufficient research yet to 
conclude  whether  the  attitudes  and  positions  adopted  by  many  of  the  clergy  of  St. 
Petersburg were widespread outside the capital, though recent studies suggest that they 
were widely shared.112 At the same time, the position of the Petersburg parish clergy was 
not universally held, particularly by the hierarchy, which opposed any involvement that 
came  too  close  to  politics—and  understanding  this  diversity  of  viewpoints  and 
approaches within the Church is necessary for any proper understanding of its role. The 
very ambivalence of the Church as a whole toward the social crises of late Imperial 
Russia  may  have  prevented  it  from having  a  greater  impact  on  society  during  the 
revolutionary years. The Church failed to meet the crisis of late Imperial Russian society 
in large part  because the hierarchy remained inflexible, particularly after 1905, in its 
understanding of social transformations and as often not hampered or restricted efforts 
of the parish clergy to respond to the needs of society.  The triumph of reaction after 
1907 silenced the more vocal demands for social and ecclesiastical reform, but did not 
end the Church’s mission to the working class and did not extinguish liberal tendencies 
within  the  Church.   By February  1917,  even  the  Church  ceased  to  support  the  old 
regime, and its collapse set the Church free to pursue its own efforts for reform and 
renewal, though the Bolshevik Revolution cut short these efforts. Ultimately, one of the 
primary aims of the communists was to eradicate  the public involvement and social 
influence of the Church, returning to the Church to the eighteenth-century preoccupation 
exclusively with ritual—a condition from which the Russian Orthodox Church is still 
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struggling to overcome.
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